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Abstract
This paper examines the linkages between international trade, environmental
degradation, and economic growth, in a dynamic North-South trade game. The
North produces manufactured goods by employing capital, labor, and a natural
resource that it imports from the South, using a neoclassical production function
subject to an endogenously improving technology. The South extracts the resource
using raw labor, in the process generating local pollution. Genetic algorithms (GA)
are used to search for optimal policies in the presence of local pollution and technol-
ogy spillovers from North to South. In the GA search for optimal regional policies,
both noncooperative and cooperative modes of trade are considered. Noncoopera-
tive trade results in inefficiencies stemming from externalities. Though cooperative
trade policies are efficient, they lack credibility. A joint maximization of the global
welfare shows that transfer of technology is a viable route to improve world welfare.
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1 Introduction
Natural resources constitute a significant source of export revenue to many nations, and in
many others, are indispensable factors of production. Extraction and/or employment of
resources as factors of production may also cause significant environmental damage that
may long persist, or that may even be irreversible. Consequently, there exists an exten-
sive economic literature devoted to study various aspects of natural resource economics
(Levhari and Mirman, 1980; Dasgupta, 1982; Dockner and Long, 1993.).
In this study, we focus on the gaming aspects of the trade in natural resources in
a complex dynamic setting. We consider the resource trade as a dynamic North/South
game (See for instance Galor, 1986; Van der Ploeg and De Zeeuw, 1992 and 1994.). As
customary in North/South trade models, we let North specialize in the production of
manufactured goods that are consumed and invested in the North or exported to the
South at a fixed world price of unity and South be the sole supplier of natural resources.
Various studies have extended this basic model to address concerns related to exter-
nalities that may accompany trade (Chichilnisky, 1993,1994; Copeland and Taylor, 1994;
Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Alemdar and O¨zyıldırım, 1998 and 2002.).
...TO BE COMPLETED.
2 The Model
2.1 Non-Cooperative North/South Trade
The global economy is comprised of two regions, North and South. Each region is pop-
ulated with infinitely lived identical individuals, LN in North and LS in South, which
grow at the exogenous rates, L˙N/LN = nN and L˙S/LS = nS , respectively. Since our
main interest lies in the analysis of how various sources of inefficiencies interact to distort
growth trajectories in an aggregative dynamic game framework, henceforth, we adopt the
social planning paradigm.
The North produces a final good, Y , which is consumed, invested, and exported to
the South at fixed price of unity. Production of manufactured goods take place according
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to a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Y = φYA
αA [uLN ]αL [vK]αKRαR (2.1)
where φY is an exogenous technological shift parameter, 0 < αi < 1 (i = A,L,K,R) are
the productive elasticities, A is an endogenously accumulated knowledge stock, u and v
are the respective shares of labor and capital employed in the final good sector. The raw
material, R, is imported from the South at a monopoly price.
Employing labor and capital, the technology sector in the North produces new tech-
nologies at a rate, J , while the stock of knowledge, A, becomes obsolete at a constant
rate, δA, so that the state of the technology evolves according to:
A˙ = φAA
βA [(1− u)LN ]βL [(1− v)K]βK − δAA = J − δAA (2.2)
where φA stands for an exogenous technological shift factor and 0 < βi < 1 (i = A,L,K)
are the productive elasticities. The stock of physical capital accumulates in pace with
investment,
K˙ = Y − CN − pR− δKK (2.3)
where CN is the aggregate consumption, p is the relative market price of resources (South-
ern terms of trade) and 0 < δK < 1 is the rate of depreciation of the physical capital.
Equation (2.3) indicates that the rate of physical capital accumulation is affected not
only by the North’s desired consumption profile, but also by the South’s. No investment
takes place in the South so that the proceeds from the resource sale are totally consumed.
Nonetheless, South indirectly affects the pace of physical capital accumulation in the
North via the desired terms of trade.
The Northern planner takes the Souther terms of trade as given and is assumed to
maximize the intertemporal utility of the representative agent, namely,
max
CN , u, v, R
JN =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρN t
1
γN
(
CN
LN
)γN
dt, 0 < ρN < 1, γN < 0 (2.4)
subject to the production and the accumulation constraints (2.1)-(2.3), K(0) = K0,
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A(0) = A0, and CN ≥ 0. CN/LN is per capita consumption and ρN denotes the Northern
time preference rate.
Turning to South, in resource extraction, the South uses a constant returns to scale
production function which is assumed, for simplicity, to be a fixed coefficient type,
R(t) = bLS(t), b > 0. We also assume that the South is unconstrained by labor availabil-
ity, LS(t).1
Resource extraction causes pollution which accumulates locally and only internalized
in the South. However, technology accumulated in the North diffuses to the South to
reduce this damage, albeit at a diminishing rate. Thus, the resulting patterns of trade
and growth are further complicated due to the presence of local externalities.
The accumulated pollution, P , evolves by:
P˙ = 1
θ
Rθ
Aε
− δPP (2.5)
where θ > 1, measures the exponential order of environmental damage due to extrac-
tion, 0 < ε < 1, is a technology diffusion (spillover) parameter signifying the degree of
applicability of technology to pollution reduction and 0 < δP < 1 denotes the constant
instantaneous rate that the pollution decays naturally.
P enters into the Southern individuals’ utility as a stock with a negative marginal
utility. Facing the Northern demand for the resource, the Southern planner takes Northern
policies as given and chooses terms of trade to maximize the Southern welfare, i.e.,
max
p
JS =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρSt
[
1
γS
(
CS
LS
)γS
−D P
LτS
]
dt, γS < 0, D > 0, ρS ∈ (0, 1) (2.6)
subject to (2.1), (2.3) and (2.5), CS = pR, P(0) = P0, K(0) = K0 and CS ≥ 0, where
ρS is the Southern rate of time preference, τ ∈ [0, 1] captures the degree to which the
representative Southerner perceives pollution as a private bad and D converts pollution
into utils. Following Eriksson and Zehaie (2002), we shall call the ratio P/LτS the perceived
1That is, the population growth rate in the South is greater than or equal to the growth rate of the
demand for the resource by the North. Also, if it is assumed that the supply of labor in the South is
perfectly elastic at a fixed real wage w(t) in terms of the industrial good, the nature of the labor force
coupled with the CRS production function would then determine labor income per unit of raw material
as w(t) = b. Competitive firms in the South will charge a price equal to the private marginal cost of
resource extraction w(t) = b. The assumed social planner in the South levies an export tax, not only to
internalize the social cost of pollution, but also to extract monopoly profit from the North.
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pollution. Note that τ = 0 corresponds to the case where pollution exhibits pure public
bad characteristics: if both pollution and population are doubled, the pollution that each
individual suffers from doubles as well. τ = 1, on the other hand, corresponds to the
case where pollution exhibits pure private bad characteristics: doubling pollution and the
population results in no more disutility of pollution per person.
2.2 Cooperative North/South Trade
In designing cooperative strategies, North and South must agree in advance as to how they
will share the potential gains from cooperation. The distributive outcome will depend on
the weights, ω, that are attached to the respective welfares. The determination of the value
of ω most likely to prevail in a cooperative agreement requires a bargaining framework
which recognizes the relative power of the participants. This is outside the scope of our
inquiry. Instead, to enable welfare comparisons across scenarios, we assume exogenously
given weights. The Pareto efficient solution is found by choosing CN , u, v, R and p to
maximize
J = ω
∫ ∞
0
e−ρN t
1
γN
(
CN
LN
)γN
dt+ (1− ω)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρSt
[
1
γS
(
CS
LS
)γS
−D P
LτS
]
dt (2.7)
subject to (2.1)-(2.3), (2.5), CS = pR, A(0) = A0, P(0) = P0, K(0) = K0 and CN ,
CS ≥ 0.
Cooperation between North and South needs to be supported by binding agreements.
Precommitment is difficult in the absence of suitable institutions which can enforce global
decisions. Nonetheless, cooperative solutions, though lacking credibility, are important in
so far as they indicate welfare loses that are likely to ensue given a lack of commitment.
3 Analytical Solution
The trade game, be it cooperative or noncooperative, as it is posited, would not admit
a constant (Pareto or Nash) equilibrium solution in the long run. Consequently, the
model needs to be appropriately scaled so that the transformed model has a steady state
solution. Towards that, and irrespective of the trading regime, we envisage a steady state
equilibrium in which the final output, Y , the physical capital, K, and consumption in the
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North, CN , and in the South, CS , all grow at the same constant rate while the pollution
stock grows at a constant rate such that, given τ , the integral in South’s problem is
convergent. Given these assumptions, to discover the balanced growth rates, we take
logarithmic differentials of the production functions (2.1)-(2.2) and Eq. (2.5), and after
few rounds of algebraic manipulations, we obtain:
Yˆ = Kˆ = CˆN = CˆS =
(αA + αR(ε/θ))βL + (αL + (αRnS(τ − γS)/θnN ))(1− βA)
(1− αK − αR(γS/θ))(1− βA)− (αA + αR(ε/θ))βK = gY nN
(3.1)
Aˆ =
βL + βKgY
1− βA nN = gAnN (3.2)
Pˆ = (γSgY + (τ − γS)(nS/nN ))nN = gPnN (3.3)
Rˆ = ((ε/θ)gA + (1/θ)gP)nN = gRnN (3.4)
pˆ = CˆS − Rˆ = gpnN (3.5)
where the hats denote the steady state growth rates of the respective variables. Note
that even though the North is indifferent to the Southern pollution when choosing
its optimal policies, nonetheless, some pollution parameters enter as determinants of
the long run Northern consumption, capital, output and technology growth. Notably,
in an environment where steady state growth is possible, a change in the technology
spillover or the environmental damage rate in the South, affects not only the levels of
Northern optimal policies, but also their permanent growth rates. More specifically,
∂Yˆ /∂ε, ∂Yˆ /∂θ, ∂Aˆ/∂Yˆ > 0.
Next, we transform each variable so that it is constant in the steady state. Thus,
we define the scaled variables as: y = Y/LgYN , k = K/L
gY
N , cn = CN/L
gY
N , a = A/L
gA
N ,
r = R/LgRN , p
∗ = p/L(gY −gR)N , P∗ = P/LgPN . For convenience, we shall refer to y, k, cn, a,
r, p∗, cs = p∗r and P∗ as scale-adjusted quantities. Now, we can re-write the scale-adjusted
output, technology, physical capital and pollution stock as:
y = φY a
αAuαL(vk)αKrαR (3.6)
a˙ = φAa
βA(1− u)βL [(1− v)k]βK − δ∗Aa = j − δ∗Aa, δ∗A = δA + nN gA (3.7)
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k˙ = y − cn − p∗r − δ∗Kk, δ∗K = δK + nN gY (3.8)
P˙∗ = 1
θ
rθ
aε
− δ∗PP∗, δ∗P = δP + nN gP (3.9)
3.1 Open-loop Nash Equilibrium Solution
We now focus on the open-loop Nash equilibrium solution of the noncooperative trade
game in terms of the scale-adjusted quantities. Taking South’s terms of trade as given, the
Northern planner maximizes the Southern welfare subject to (3.6)-(3.8), cn ≥ 0, k(0) = k0
and a(0) = a0.
max
cn, u, v, r
Jn =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρnt
1
γN
cγNn dt, ρn = ρN − (gY − 1)γNnN (3.10)
Using Pontryagin’s minimum principle, the following are the necessary conditions:
cγN−1n = λ1 (3.11)
λ1αL
y
u
= λ2βL
j
(1− u) (3.12)
λ1αK
y
v
= λ2βK
j
(1− v) (3.13)
λ1(αR
y
r
− p∗) = 0 (3.14)
λ˙1 = (ρn + δ
∗
K − αK
y
k
)λ1 − βK j
k
λ2 (3.15)
λ˙2 = (ρn + δ
∗
A − βA
j
a
)λ2 − λ1αAy
a
(3.16)
lim
t→∞
e−ρntλ1k → 0, lim
t→∞
e−ρntλ2a→ 0 (3.17)
where λ1, λ2 are the shadow values of aggregate physical capital and knowledge, respec-
tively.
Eq. (3.11) states that along the optimal paths the marginal utility from consumption
should equal to that of physical capital at every point in time. Eq.s (3.12) and (3.13)
determine the sectoral allocations of labor and capital so that their respective shadow
values are the same across sectors. Eq. (3.15) implies that the marginal return to physical
capital must equal the return on consumption, both measured in terms of the final output.
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Analogously, Eq. (3.16) requires the return on technology be equated to the return on
consumption, both expressed in units of knowledge, at the margin.
The demand for the resource is given by Eq.s (3.11) and (3.14),
r = (αRφY a
αAuαL(vk)αK )
1
1−αR p
∗ −1
1−αR (3.18)
The respective optimal shares of labor and capital in the final good production are
u = u(λ1, λ2, a, k) and v = v(λ1, λ2, a, k) by Eq.s (3.12) and (3.13). Consequently,
Sgn(∂u/∂k) = Sgn(αL − βL); Sgn(∂v/∂k) = Sgn(αK − βK);
Sgn(∂u/∂a) = Sgn(∂v/∂a) = Sgn(αA − βA) and ∂v/∂u > 0.
Intuitively, an increase in the stock of physical capital (technology) will cause a net
shift in employment and physical capital towards the sector in which physical capital
(technology) is more productive.
As for the South, faced with the demand for the resource by the North, Eq. (3.18),
and taking the Northern policies as given, the Southern planner chooses a path of scale-
adjusted terms of trade to maximize the Southern welfare subject to (3.6), (3.8) and (3.9),
cs ≥ 0, k(0) = k0 and P∗(0) = P∗0 .
max
p∗
Js =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρst
(
1
γS
cγSs −DP∗
)
dt, ρs = ρS − (gY nN − nS)γS (3.19)
The necessary conditions for the South are:
cγS−1s = −
(1− αR)
αR
µ1 − r
θ−1
αRp∗aε
µ2 (3.20)
µ˙1 = (ρs + δ
∗
K − αK
y
k
)µ1 − r
θ
aε
αK
(1− αR)kµ2 −
αK
(1− αR)kc
γS
s (3.21)
µ˙2 = (ρs + δ
∗
P)µ2 +D (3.22)
lim
t→∞
e−ρstµ1k → 0, lim
t→∞
e−ρstµ2P∗ → 0 (3.23)
where µ1, µ2 are the respective shadow values of the stocks of aggregate physical capital
and pollution.
From Eq. (3.20), optimal Southern terms of trade must be so chosen that the sum
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of incremental benefits from consumption and physical capital is equal to the marginal
cost of pollution. Notice from Eq. (3.21), that the value of an extra unit of physical
capital stock in the South, not surprisingly, evolves differently from the North in so far as
the former internalizes the interaction between capital and pollution accumulation. Eq.
(3.22), on the other hand, shows how the marginal social cost of pollution will increase
as pollution itself accumulates.
Next, we consider the Nash equilibrium of this game at the steady state. A joint
stationary solution of the optimality conditions for both regions determine the long run
equilibrium of the trade game. Hence, assuming steady state, the following set of equations
constitute the Nash equilibrium where the stationary variables are denoted by “∼ ”:
y˜
k˜
− c˜n
k˜
− p˜
∗r˜
k˜
− δ∗K = 0 (3.24)
j˜
a˜
− δ∗A = 0 (3.25)
1
θ
r˜θ
P˜∗a˜ε − δ
∗
P = 0 (3.26)
αR
y˜
r˜
− p˜∗ = 0 (3.27)
v˜ − αKβLu˜
αKβLu˜+ αLβK(1− u˜) = 0 (3.28)
ρn + δ
∗
K − αK
y˜
k˜
− βKαL(1− u˜)
βLu˜
y˜
k˜
= 0 (3.29)
ρn + δ
∗
A − βA
j˜
a˜
− αAβLu˜
(1− u˜)αL
j˜
a˜
= 0 (3.30)
−αR(p˜∗r˜)γS −
αK p˜
∗r˜((p˜∗r˜)γS − r˜θD
a˜ε(ρs+δ∗P )
)
k˜(ρs + δ∗K − αK y˜k˜ )
+
Dr˜θ
a˜ε(ρs + δ∗P)
= 0 (3.31)
We proceed to solve the system of equations as follows: First, we get the equilibrium
growth rate of technology, j˜/a˜ = J˜/A˜ from Eq. (3.25). Given the growth rate of tech-
nology, we obtain the stationary sectoral allocation of labor, u˜ from Eq. (3.30). Having
derived u˜, we use Eq.s (3.28) and (3.29) to solve for the long run sectoral allocation of
capital, v˜, and the output-capital ratio, y˜/k˜, respectively. Given y˜/k˜, the ratio of the
South’s consumption to capital, p˜∗r˜/k˜ can now be solved for from Eq. (3.27). Now that
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we know y˜/k˜ and p˜∗r˜/k˜, Eq. (3.24) determines the ratio of the North’s consumption to
capital, c˜n/k˜, while Eq.s (3.26) and (3.31) imply the ratio P˜∗/k˜γS . Given P˜∗/k˜γS , u˜ and
v˜, the ratio r˜θ/k˜γS+εβK/(1−βA) can be obtained from Eqs. (3.25) and (3.26). We use the
production function for the final good and Eq. (3.25) to find the stock of capital, k˜, given
r˜θ/k˜γS+εβK/(1−βA), y˜/k˜, u˜ and v˜. Having obtained k˜, a˜ and r˜ are derived from Eq. (3.25)
given u˜ and v˜ and the ratio r˜θ/k˜γS+εβK/(1−βA). Finally, given r˜ and p˜∗r˜/k˜, we solve for p˜∗.
3.2 Open-loop Cooperative Solution
To be able to solve the cooperative game, it is required that the scale-adjusted discount
rates be the same for both regions; that is, ρn = ρs = ρ. Even though this condition is
not necessary under noncooperation, nevertheless, we choose parameter values to satisfy
this requirement so that we can compare the numerical approximations of the cooperative
and noncooperative trade games.
Written in terms of the scale-adjusted quantities, the Pareto efficient paths maximize
the weighted sum of welfares subject to (3.6)-(3.9), cn, cs ≥ 0, k(0) = k0, a(0) = a0 and
P∗(0) = P∗0 . Although, at first blush, this may seem like a straightforward optimization
problem in contrast with the noncooperative mode of the game, any attempt at solution
defies this early optimism. Unfortunately, the steady state of the model does not admit
a closed form solution.
max
cn, p∗, r, u, v
J =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
ω
1
γN
cγNn + (1− ω)
(
1
γS
cγSs −DP∗
)]
dt (3.32)
The necessary conditions are:
ωcγN−1n = υ1 (3.33)
(1− ω)cγS−1s = υ1 (3.34)
αR
y
r
υ1 +
rθ−1
aε
υ3 = 0 (3.35)
υ1αL
y
u
= υ2βL
j
(1− u) (3.36)
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υ1αK
y
v
= υ2βK
j
(1− v) (3.37)
υ˙1 = (ρ+ δ
∗
K − αK
y
k
)υ1 − βK j
k
υ2 (3.38)
υ˙2 = (ρ+ δ
∗
A − βA
j
a
)υ2 − υ1αAy
a
+
ε
aθ
rθ
aε
υ3 (3.39)
υ˙3 = (ρ+ δ
∗
P)υ3 + (1− ω)D (3.40)
lim
t→∞
e−ρtυ1k → 0, lim
t→∞
e−ρtυ2a→ 0, lim
t→∞
e−ρtυ3P∗ → 0 (3.41)
where υ1, υ2 and υ3 are the shadow values of aggregate physical capital, technology and
pollution, respectively.
We note from Eq.s (3.33) and (3.34) that along the Pareto efficient paths, the weighted
marginal utilities of consumption in both regions are the same. Moreover, Eq.s (3.33),
(3.34) and (3.35), imply an efficient resource price which would equate the marginal
global benefits of resource use (the weighted marginal utility of consumption in both
regions times the marginal product of resources) to the marginal pollution costs in the
South (valued at the shadow price of pollution in the South). Also, Eq.s (3.36) and
(3.37), indicate a sectoral allocation rule for labor and capital such that productivities
are equalized at the margin. Finally, Eqs. (3.38), (3.39) and (3.40) indicate how the
globally efficient shadow values of k, a and P∗ will move over time.
The following system of equations indicate the steady state of the cooperative trade
game where the efficient levels of the stationary variables are denoted by “^ ”,
y˘
k˘
− c˘n
k˘
− p˘
∗r˘
k˘
− δ∗K = 0 (3.42)
j˘
a˘
− δ∗A = 0 (3.43)
1
θ
r˘θ
P˘∗a˘ε − δ
∗
P = 0 (3.44)
v˘ − αKβLu˘
αKβLu˘+ αLβK(1− u˘) = 0 (3.45)
ρ+ δ∗K − αK
y˘
k˘
− βKαL(1− u˘)
βLu˘
y˘
k˘
= 0 (3.46)
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ρ+ δ∗A − βA
j˘
a˘
− (αA + (ε/θ)αR) βLu˘
αL(1− u˘)
j˘
a˘
= 0 (3.47)
αRy˘ωc˘
γN−1
n −
(1− ω)Dr˘θ
(ρ+ δ∗P)a˘ε
= 0 (3.48)
ωc˘γN−1n − (1− ω)(p˘∗r˘)γS−1 = 0 (3.49)
As previously mentioned, no closed form solutions for the steady state values exists,
except for the sectoral allocations of labor and physical capital, and the output capital
ratio. Using (3.43) one can get the equilibrium growth rate of knowledge, j˘/a˘ = J˘/A˘.
Then, Eq. (3.47) can be used to determine the constant sectoral allocation of labor, u˘.2
Subsequently, Eq.s (3.45) and (3.46) will give us the sectoral allocation of capital, v˘, and
the output-capital ratio, y˘/k˘, respectively. For the rest of the variables, one needs to
employ a numerical method to obtain their equilibrium values. In the next section, we
describe the numerical algorithms which approximate not only the steady state but, also
the transient dynamics under various parameter configurations.
4 Numerical Approximation of the Model
4.1 Genetic Algorithms For Non-cooperative Open-loop Dy-
namic Games
In order to determine the open-loop Nash equilibria of the two-person differential trade
game, two optimal control problems need to be solved simultaneously (Bas¸ar and Oldser,
1982). Our numerical solution strategy is first to transform the infinite horizon differential
game into a finite horizon difference game using time aggregation as in Michele and
Mecenier (1994), and then, to use genetic algorithms to optimize each problem using
synchronous updating. That is, once best to date policies are found within each separate
populations, they are passed on to the other player (GA) via the computer shared memory
so that GAs can breed new and fitter populations of candidate solutions in the light of
the updated policies.
2Note from Eq.s (3.45) and (3.47) that under cooperation higher fractions of capital and labor are
allocated to the technology sector due to the fact that the marginal benefit from the accelerated knowledge
accumulation from the North is now internalized in both regions.
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The following pseudo code shows the general outline of the algorithm for the two-region
dynamic trade game:
procedure North GA; procedure South GA;
begin begin
Randomly initialize PopN (0); Randomly initialize PopS(0);
Shared memory; Shared memory;
synchronize; synchronize;
evaluate PopN (0); evaluate PopS(0);
z = 1; z = 1;
repeat repeat
select PopN (z) from PopN (z − 1); select PopS(z) from PopS(z − 1);
copy best to shared memory; copy best to shared memory;
synchronize; synchronize;
crossover and mutate PopN (z); crossover and mutate PopS(z);
evaluate PopN (z); evaluate PopS(z);
z=z+1; z=z+1;
until(termination condition); until(termination condition);
end; end;
In each step of this algorithm, two GAs evolve a constant size population of potential
solutions. In order to reduce the time complexity, the two GAs are evolved for one
generation while continuously sharing the best responses. The synchronize statement
in the above algorithm is a protocol whereby each party is to wait for the other side
to update their respective best structures before proceeding with a new search. This
approach reduces time complexity while at the same time ensuring the convergence to the
global Nash equilibrium.
4.2 Genetic Algorithm For Cooperative Games
In the cooperative trade game, the strategic rivalry that exists in the noncooperative
trade game is eliminated by way of an “arbitration” whereby the “global fitness” as the
weighted sum of each region’s respective welfare (fitness) is maximized. The cooperative
trade game is thus reduced to a typical control problem which can be solved by standard
GA techniques (Krishnakumar and Goldberg ,1992 and Michalewicz, 1992). The trade
game involves both equality and inequality constraints. The equalities are eliminated
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at the start by substitution. We penalize the remaining constraint violations by a large
reduction in the fitness so as to remain within the feasible region.3 Generally speaking,
for s control variables, T periods, and l potential solutions, a GA performs the following
steps to optimize a control problem: (1) Randomly generate an initial potential solution
set, (2) Evaluate the fitness value for a solution set of sTl, (3) Apply selection, crossover,
and mutation operations to each set of solutions to reproduce a new population, (4)
Repeat steps (1), (2) and (3) until computation is terminated according to a convergence
criterion, (5) Choose the solution set sT based on the best fitness value from the current
generations as the optimal solution set.
5 Numerical Experiments
5.1 Discretization and Numerical Parameters
We discretize problems (3.10), (3.19) and (3.32) along the lines suggested by Mercenier and
Michel (1994) which ensures the steady state invariance between the continuous model and
its discrete analog. The discrete-time approximation of infinite horizon noncooperative
North/South trade model with steady state invariance is as follows.4 The cooperative
model is time aggregated in a similar fashion.
North:
max Jn =
H−1∑
h=0
µNh
(
1
γN
cγNn
)
+ µNH−1G
N (k(tH), a(tH)) subject to
k(th+1)− k(th) = ∆h(y(th)− cN (th)− p∗(th)r(th)− δ∗Kk(th))
a(th+1)− a(th) = ∆h(φAaβA(1− u)βL [(1− v)k]βK − δ∗Aa(th))
k(0) and a(0) given.
South:
max Js =
H−1∑
h=0
µS1,h
(
1
γS
cγSs −DP∗
)
+ µSH−1G
S(k(tH),P∗(tH)) subject to
3See Michalewicz (1992) for various GA approaches to handle linear constraints.
4See Alemdar and O¨zyıldırım (1998) for derivation.
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k(th+1)− k(th) = ∆h(y(th)− cN (th)− p∗(th)r(th)− δ∗Kk(th))
P∗(th+1)− P∗(th) = ∆h
(
1
θ
rθ
aε
− δ∗PP∗
)
k(0) and P∗(0) given.
where H is the assumed terminal time when the stationary state is reached, ∆h is a scalar
factor that converts the continuous flow into stock increments, ∆h = th+1 − th and µj is
the sequence of discount factors of the region i = N ,S for which the stationary solution
of the discrete-time problem is equivalent to the corresponding continuous-time problem.
These sequences are given by the following recursions:
µNh =
µNh−1
1 + ∆hρn
, µSh =
µSh−1
1 + ∆hρs
where µN0 > 0 and µ
S
0 > 0. The functions G
j(.), j = N ,S, denote the terminal values.
Displayed in Table 1 are the set of benchmark parameter values used in the numerical
simulations. For the North, the baseline parameter values are adopted from earlier studies
using calibration exercises.5
Table 1: Benchmark parameters
Production: φY = 1.0, αK = 0.35, αL = 0.65, αA = 0.15, αR = 0.10
Technology: φA = 1.0, βA = 0.60, βL = 0.50, βK = 0.20
Pollution: δP = 0.08, ε = 0.10, θ = 2.0
Preferences: ρN = 0.04, ρS = 0.04, γN = −0.5, γS = −0.5, D = 0.01, τ = 0
Depreciation
& population: δK = 0.05, δA = 0.01, nN = 0.015, nS = 0.015
Both the final good and the new technologies exhibit increasing returns to scale.6 In
both regions, we assume a rate of time preference of 4 percent and an intertemporal elastic-
ity of substitution of 67 percent .7 Physical capital is assumed to depreciate at 5 percent,
which is a common benchmark in the real business cycle literature; see e.g. Cooley (1995).
5See, for example, Lucas (1988), Ortigueira and Santos (1997), and Jones (1995).
6There does not exist much empirical literature on research functions, especially if separate elasticities
for labor, capital and technology are required. For example, Adams (1990) and Caballero and Jaffee
(1993) provide thorough empirical investigations that are ultimately unsuccessful in reporting separate
elasticities for labor and technology.
7The empirical evidence on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for the United States is quite
varied, ranging between 0.1 (Hall, 1988) and 1 (Beaudry and van Wincoop, 1995).
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The knowledge, on the other hand, depreciates at a slower rate of 1 percent. Populations
are assumed to grow at 1.5 percent. Information on pollution parameter values is sparse,
and therefore, we conduct some sensitivity analysis with alternative parameter values.
Equal weights, ω = 0.5, are assigned to both regions in the cooperative game. With these
benchmark parameter values, pollution exhibits pure public bad characteristics, and we
have gY = 1.454, gA = 1.977, gP = −0.227 and gR = −0.015. The benchmark equilibrium
values are reported in Table 2.
Table 2: Benchmark Equilibrium Values
Non-cooperation
p˜∗ r˜ u˜ v˜ k˜ P˜∗ a˜ c˜n
0.307 1.641 0.928 0.946 14.571 11.033 105.153 3.491
Cooperation
p˘∗ r˘ u˘ v˘ k˘ P˘∗ a˘ c˘n
1.165 1.861 0.926 0.944 18.161 13.955 124.037 2.169
As for the genetic operators in the numerical experiments, we use the public domain
GENESIS as a platform (Grefenstette, 1990) and modify the GENESIS codes as we need
them. All experiments are run on a IBM RS/6000 running AIX 5.2. A typical run uses
population size, j = 50, runs 2 million generations, crossover rate is 0.60 and mutation
rate is 0.001. None of the results depends on the values of genetic operators other than
run time by the choice of number of generations.
For each parameter configuration, we have to implement two separate experiments.
Hence, we are limited by the increased computational costs in our scope for a complete
sensitivity analysis. The selection strategy is elitist so that the best performing strategy
in the population of survivors is retained. Were it not for the elitist selection, the best
structures may disappear making for a nonconvergence.
Since GAs work with constant-size populations of candidate solutions, GA searches
are initialized from a number of points. Initialization routines may vary. We however
start from randomly generated populations so as not to prejudice the convergence of the
populations on the initial ones. Therefore, a randomly initialized GA is less prone to
numerical instability that may be caused by initialization. For the GA parameters which
might cause instability, we used the parameters chosen and studied on various optimiza-
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tion experiments by Grefenstette (1986). From the result of the experiments in the paper,
the convergence is self evident. The termination conditions are specified beforehand as
a certain number of iterations. We gradually increase the number of iterations until no
further improvements are observed. In the time-aggregated model, we assume 31 periods
(H = 31) with a dense equally spaced gridding of the time horizon T (t(H) = 360), which
is sufficient to capture the convergence over time.
5.2 Numerical Findings
Figures 1-16 of Appendix and Tables 3-6 summarize our numerical findings based on the
assumed parameter values. First, with benchmark parameter values, global welfare under
cooperation is 36.96% higher compared to noncooperation. Furthermore, South has more
to gain from such a regime switch (Southern welfare increases by 51.18% while Northern
welfare decreases by 21.18%) indicating the severity of the Northern noncooperation.
Moreover, as depicted in Table 3, the welfare improvements in response to the variations
in the benchmark parameter values are usually larger under a cooperative trade regime
attesting to the severity of loss of efficiency due to policy spillover.
Table 3: Percentage welfare changes from benchmark under alternate parameter values
North South Global
Noncoop. Coop. Noncoop. Coop. Noncoop. Coop.
ε = 0.50 6.14 6.33 6.04 6.17 6.07 6.25
θ = 4.0 -1.58 -2.02 -0.33 1.13 -0.67 -0.37
φY = 2.0 35.30 35.26 34.62 34.14 34.80 34.67
φA = 2.0 4.85 4.75 4.43 4.71 4.54 4.73
Studying Figures 1-16, a number of results stand out. To wit, in the long-run coop-
eration leads to sizable increases in physical capital and knowledge stocks, resource use
and Southern terms of trade (hence in the Southern consumption) at the expense of more
polluted Southern environment. The shares of labor and capital in the final good sector
and Northern consumption, on the other hand, are lower with cooperation regardless of
the parameter values.
Thus, noncooperative Northern investment plans are globally inefficient as they un-
derstate the true world marginal benefit by the amount of the marginal improvement in
the Southern welfare due to the incremental reduction in the pollution level. On the other
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hand, Southern noncooperation adds to the dynamic inefficiency to the extent her market
power limits growth in the North. This deleterious effect of resource monopoly, however,
is mitigated to the degree South internalizes the knowledge spillovers.
The dynamic inefficiency of the noncooperative trade regime and the failure of co-
operation can be explained as follows. In the noncooperative mode, the shadow value
(the marginal benefit) of the physical capital stock differs for the two regions as the
regions have different preferences (fitnesses) leading to conflicting policies and harmful
‘policy externalities’. Moreover, when policies are chosen with a view to maximize own
fitnesses taking the rival’s as given, the ‘incentive’ effects of the policies are ignored. The
South chooses resource prices for any ‘given’ investment policy for physical capital of the
North, thus, ignoring the fact that a lower price today (lower Southern consumption) may
‘induce’ the North to invest in physical capital more today which then leads to higher
knowledge stock and higher prices (higher Southern consumption) as the higher capital
stock shifts the demand for resources tomorrow. The North, on the other hand, ignores
the fact that an initially higher investment in physical capital (hence in knowledge stock)
at the expense of lower Northern consumption may induce South to ask for lower resource
prices today in return for higher prices tomorrow (as the demand for resources will shift)
and also lead to higher Northern consumption in the future as the amount to be invested
will be lower in the future (higher Northern consumption).
Parties ignore the incentive effects for the fact that promises are not credible. If South
were to offer cooperative prices, it would not be optimal for the North to invest in physical
capital as much promised as along the cooperative path: North will consume more and
invest less. Likewise, if North were to commit itself to the investment plan along the
cooperative path, then it would not be optimal for the South to ask for the cooperative
prices: South will raise prices and consume more. Failing to cooperate, the parties will
revert to their respective Nash strategies.
5.3 Changes in the Knowledge Diffusion
We first investigate effect of an increased knowledge diffusion rate from ε = 0.10 to
ε = 0.50. With the new rate of knowledge spillovers, the growth rates of final output,
gY , technology, gA, and pollution, gP , increase to 1.521, 2.011 and 0.372, respectively,
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while the growth rate of resource, gR, decreases to -0.261. The equilibrium values with
the new knowledge spillover rate are reported in Table 4.8
Table 4: Equilibrium Values
Non-cooperation
p˜∗ r˜ u˜ v˜ k˜ P˜∗ a˜ c˜n
0.143 4.054 0.928 0.946 16.547 10.355 108.825 4.014
Cooperation
p˘∗ r˘ u˘ v˘ k˘ P˘∗ a˘ c˘n
0.530 4.948 0.917 0.937 21.889 12.691 160.726 2.624
First, note from the first order conditions that an increase in gY causes a shift in
employment and physical capital from the final goods sector to the technology sector
under both cooperative and noncooperative modes of trade. Additionally, from a global
efficiency point of view, technology is less pollutant, this shift in employment and capital
to the technology sector is stronger under a cooperative trading regime.
Observe from Table 3 the increase in regional welfares attendant with stronger tech-
nology diffusion. We see about %6.07 improvement in global welfare with uncoordinated
trading policies attesting to the importance of access to knowledge. The policy implication
is that even if the parties fail, say due to enforcement problems, to realize the first best so-
lution, they may still achieve significant improvements in global welfare by strengthening
the knowledge flows from North to South. It may be costly to set up global institutions to
monitor and enforce North/South cooperations. To the extent that knowledge diffusion
can be enhanced relatively cheaply, regions may opt to cooperate on sharing knowledge
related to pollution control.
Figures 1-4 show that when knowledge spillovers get stronger, the marginal cost of
pollution falls, thus inducing South to ask for lower prices for the resource. Consequently,
lower resource prices enable North to accumulate not only more physical but, also more
technology shifting labor and capital to the technology sector thereby leading to a lower
level of pollution. These effects are more significant in the cooperative game since the
positive effect of knowledge spillovers on pollution accumulation is internalized in both
8Because of the chosen parameter values, when noncooperation is assumed, changes in equilibrium
u and v values under alternate knowledge spillover rates are small and not reflected in Table 4. Here
equilibrium values of u and v decrease by 0.00005 and 0.00004 respectively. This can be observed from
Figure 2.
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regions.
5.4 Changes in resource damage rate
We now increase the order of environmental damage due to resource extraction from
θ = 2.0 to θ = 4.0. With this change, the growth rates of final output, gY , technology,
gA, and resource, gR increase to 1.455, 1.978 and -0.007, respectively, while the growth
rate of pollution, gP , decreases to -0.228. The equilibrium values with the new rate of
environmental damage are displayed in Table 5.9
Table 5: Equilibrium Values
Non-cooperation
p˜∗ r˜ u˜ v˜ k˜ P˜∗ a˜ c˜n
0.376 1.287 0.928 0.946 13.969 5.634 103.023 3.347
Cooperation
p˘∗ r˘ u˘ v˘ k˘ P˘∗ a˘ c˘n
1.492 1.369 0.927 0.945 17.074 7.126 117.022 2.043
Observe from Figures 5-8 that along with increase in the order of environmental dam-
age, the marginal cost of pollution rises in the South thus increasing the prices for the
resource. With higher resource prices, North slows down accumulation of not only phys-
ical capital but also knowledge by shifting labor and capital away from the technology
sector. However, the effect of the decrease in resource use dominates the effect of the
decrease in knowledge stock, leading to lower pollution in the South. Again, these effects
are stronger under cooperation as since pollution is globally internalized.
Furthermore, observe from Table 3 the decrease in regional welfares due to stronger
environmental damage. Under noncooperation, the Northern and the Southern welfares
decrease by 1.58% and 0.33%, respectively. With cooperation, while the Northern welfare
further deteriorates, the Southern welfare further improves. Whereas the global welfare
worsens by about a 0.67% with noncooperation, it declines by 0.37% with cooperation.
9Due to the chosen parameter values, changes in equilibrium u and v values under noncooperation
with alternate environmental damage rates are very small and not reflected in Table 5. Here equilibrium
values of u and v decrease by 0.000001 and 0.0000008 respectively.
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5.5 Productivity shocks in final good sector
We now investigate the long run effects of an exogenous change in the productivity of the
final output. With a productivity shock, the growth rates remains the same.
Table 6: Equilibrium Values
Non-cooperation
p˜∗ r˜ u˜ v˜ k˜ P˜∗ a˜ c˜n
1.273 1.264 0.928 0.946 46.483 6.177 187.812 11.137
Cooperation
p˘∗ r˘ u˘ v˘ k˘ P˘∗ a˘ c˘n
4.838 1.428 0.926 0.944 57.789 7.754 220.923 6.906
First, observe the substantial improvements in Northern, Southern and global welfares
under both cooperative and noncooperative trading policies from Table 3. Though percent
welfare improvements with noncooperative and cooperative policies are almost the same,
cooperative trading policy leads to higher levels of welfare for both regions.
Note from Figures 9-12 that increased productivity in the final good sector results
higher levels of both technology and capital. Increased knowledge stock decreases pollu-
tion. Also, demand for the resource by the North decreases, leading to higher Southern
terms of trade.
5.6 Productivity shocks in technology sector
Finally, we investigate the long run effects of an exogenous change in the productivity of
the technology. The growth rates again remains the same.
First, observe the substantial improvements in Northern, Southern and global welfares
under both cooperative and noncooperative trading policies from Table 3. Also note that
cooperation again leads to higher welfare improvements.
Notice from Figures 13-16 that the initial shift in employment and physical capital
to technology sector becomes more significant due to increased productivity. Also, since
the flow of knowledge stock increases, final output (hence physical capital) increases and
pollution falls. Moreover, due to higher flow of technology, the demand for the resource
by the North decreases, leading to higher Southern terms of trade.
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Table 7: Equilibrium Values
Non-cooperation
p˜∗ r˜ u˜ v˜ k˜ P˜∗ a˜ c˜n
0.489 1.617 0.928 0.946 22.381 8.814 743.929 5.471
Cooperation
p˘∗ r˘ u˘ v˘ k˘ P˘∗ a˘ c˘n
1.858 1.827 0.926 0.944 28.384 11.062 875.091 3.393
Note that even though the directions of changes with a technology shock are same
as the directions of changes with a productivity shock, a technology shock affects the
final good production through its productive elasticity whereas a productivity shock has
a direct and more substantial effect.
6 Conclusion
TO BE COMPLETED.
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Appendix: Figures
The benchmark equilibrium values are represented with a dotted line in the pictures
below. In Figures 1 and 5, however, the benchmark equilibrium values are not displayed
as otherwise the dynamics become invisible due to the differences in magnitudes.
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Figure 1. Scale-adjusted price and resource
0 90 180 270 360
0.915
0.917
0.919
0.921
0.923
0.925
0.927
t
u
 (C
oo
p)
ε=0.50
0 90 180 270 360
0.928
0.9285
0.929
0.9295
0.93
0.9305
t
u
 (N
on
−c
oo
p)
0 90 180 270 360
0.935
0.937
0.939
0.941
0.943
0.945
t
v 
(C
oo
p)
0 90 180 270 360
0.9455
0.946
0.9465
0.947
0.9475
0.948
t
v 
(N
on
−c
oo
p)
Figure 2. Sectoral allocations of labor and capital
24
0 90 180 270 360
18
19
20
21
22
t
ca
pi
ta
l (C
oo
p)
ε=0.50
0 90 180 270 360
14.5
15
15.5
16
16.5
17
t
ca
pi
ta
l (N
on
−c
oo
p)
0 90 180 270 360
120
130
140
150
160
170
t
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 (C
oo
p)
0 90 180 270 360
102
104
106
108
110
t
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 (N
on
−c
oo
p)
Figure 3. Scale-adjusted capital and technology
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Figure 4. Scale-adjusted pollution
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Figure 5. Scale-adjusted price and resource
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Figure 6. Sectoral allocations of labor and capital
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Figure 7. Scale-adjusted capital and technology
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Figure 8. Scale-adjusted pollution
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Figure 9. Scale-adjusted price and resource
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Figure 11. Scale-adjusted capital and technology
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Figure 12. Scale-adjusted pollution
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Figure 13. Scale-adjusted price and resource
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Figure 15. Scale-adjusted capital and technology
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Figure 16. Scale-adjusted pollution
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